MattG23Seattle
06-17-2008, 21:33
Link to Word Document on my web server:
158 Wn. 2d. 342, Oct. 2006 Pac. Nw. Shooting Park Ass'n v. City of Sequim (http://pws.cablespeed.com/~matthughes/Precedent.doc)
Highlights:
SANDERS , J.M. JOHNSON , and CHAMBERS , JJ., dissent by separate opinions.
Nature of Action: A gun show organizer and a federally licensed firearms collector sought damages from a city and its police chief for tortious interference with a contractual relationship or business expectancy. The plaintiffs also alleged statutory violations by the defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that three of the conditions placed on the temporary use permit issued by the city for use of the city's convention center for a gun show were unlawful and improper.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Clallam County, No. 02-2-00866-9, Thomas J. Majhan, J., on June 23, 2003, entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
Court of Appeals: The court affirmed the judgment by an unpublished opinion noted at 123 Wn. App. 1014 (2004).
Supreme Court: Holding that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead a claim for tortious interference with contractual relationships or business expectancies between gun show vendors and the general public and that the permit conditions did not violate statutes restricting what sorts of gun ordinances municipalities may enact, the court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
John D. Black (of John D. Black, P.L.L.C. ) and Richard M. Stephens (of Groen Stephens & Klinge, L.L.P. ), for petitioners.
Robert L. Christie (of Christie Law Group, P.L.L.C. ), for respondents.
1. FAIRHURST, J. - Petitioners Pacific Northwest Shooting Park Association (PNSPA), a nonprofit corporation, and Lawrence Witt, a federally licensed firearms collector, seek reversal of an unpublished Court of Appeals decision affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the city of Sequim. PNSPA brought suit against the city and its police chief, Byron Nelson, alleging tortious interference with a contractual relationship or business expectancy between PNSPA and the city to use the city's convention center for a gun show. It also claimed that the city's actions violated RCW 9.41.290 and .300. PNSPA later argued that the city interfered with its business expectancies with vendors and the general public, but it failed to amend its complaint to add this claim. We hold that the question of interference with PNSPA's contractual relationships or business expectancies with vendors and the general public is not properly before us and do not decide the question. We also find that the city did not violate either RCW 9.41.290 or .300. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
I. FACTS
2. On April 3, 2002, PNSPA applied to the city for a temporary use permit to hold a gun show at the Guy Cole Convention Center from April 13 to April 14, 2002. The purpose stated on the application was for a gun show that was to include sales and "Display of Merchandise." Suppl. Clerk's Papers (SCP) at 8. On the application form, PNSPA was required to indicate what the property would be used for and the application stated that approval was subject to any attached conditions. The city distributed the application form, along with a separate memorandum, to Clallam County Fire District No. 3, the police department, public works, and the city manager, soliciting their comments or conditions. The public works department and the city manager each returned a copy of the separate memorandum with handwritten comments and questions. The fire district and the police department provided separate memoranda with their conditions.
3. An undated document entitled "Special Conditions of Approval" was attached to the permit application. SCP at 13. It listed five conditions.«1»Only the first of these "special" conditions, the attached conditions from the police department, is at issue here.
«1»The first condition referred to separate attached conditions from the police department. The second condition required that PNSPA comply with city sign regulations. The third condition referred to separate attached conditions from the fire district. The fourth condition required that the city be listed as the point of sale for all transactions. The fifth condition required PNSPA to contact the planning, public works, and police departments to verify that it was in compliance before the show.
4. Chief Nelson sent two memoranda to the city planning department, one dated April 9, 2002, and a second dated April 11, 2002, that superseded the April 9, 2002, memorandum. Only the second memorandum is at issue. April 11, 2002, is the date on which the city gave final approval to the permit application. The April 11, 2002, memorandum had 15 conditions, only three of which are being contested. The conditions required that (1) only dealers could "dispose of" handguns and then only to state residents, (2) only dealers could purchase or acquire firearms from unlicensed individuals, and (3) unlicensed dealers could not sell firearms at all. SCP at 18.
5. It is not clear from the record whether PNSPA received a copy of the April 9, 2002, memorandum, nor is it clear whether PNSPA received copies of the approved permit with all the referenced attachments on April 11, 2002, the date it was approved. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the conditions were imposed as part of a routine internal process for approval of applications to use the convention center, and PNSPA was aware in advance that the city might impose conditions on that use. Further, PNSPA does not allege that it failed to receive timely the documents containing the permit conditions. PNSPA merely alleges that Chief Nelson acted improperly by coming to the convention center on April 12, 2002, the day before the show, and "announcing" the conditions of use to the participants. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 80. As a result of Chief Nelson's "announcement," PNSPA claims that many vendors packed up and left the show and attendance by the public was significantly lower than expected. Id .
31 A municipality acts in a proprietary capacity when it "acts as the proprietor of a business enterprise for the private advantage of the [municipality]" and it may "exercise its business powers in much the same way as a private individual or corporation." Hite v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2 of Grant County , 112 Wn.2d 456 , 459, 772 P.2d 481 (1989); Branson v. Port of Seattle , 152 Wn.2d 862 , 870, 101 P.3d 67 (2004). When acting in a proprietary capacity, a city may enter into any contract " 'which is necessary to render the system efficient and beneficial to the public.' " Hite , 112 Wn.2d at 460 (quoting Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 , 17 Wn. App. 861 , 864, 565 P.2d 1221 (1977)); see also Stover v. Winston Bros. Co. , 185 Wash. 416 , 422, 55 P.2d 821 (1936). By issuing a temporary use permit, the city was leasing its property to PNSPA and acting in its private capacity as a property owner.
32 The preemption clause does not prohibit a private property owner from imposing conditions on the sale of firearms on his or her property. RCW 9.41.290 . Applying our reasoning in Cherry , it follows that a municipal property owner like a private property owner may impose conditions related to firearms for the use of its property in order to protect its property interests. For the same reason that a municipal employer may enact policies regarding possession of firearms in the workplace because a private employer may do so, a municipal property owner should be allowed to impose conditions related to sales of firearms on its property if a private property owner may impose them. The critical point is that the conditions the city imposed related to a permit for private use of its property. They were not laws or regulations of application to the general public.
[7, 8]27 The text of RCW 9.41.290 states that the state of Washington has fully occupied and preempted the field of firearms regulation. That preemption covers regulations related to possession, purchase, sale, acquisition, and transfer of firearms, all of which are potentially at issue at a gun show. However, RCW 9.41.290 and .300 together explicitly allow cities, towns, counties, and municipalities to enact laws and ordinances restricting firearm possession in stadiums and convention centers they operate.
I have not had the time to read through the whole thing but have summarized the key wording as best that I can in 10 minutes. Most of us know most of the wording here except for the opinioned pieces but at this time I am concluding that he is trying to extend their right to enact laws concerning possession in stadiums and conventions to other city property by citing this case and using their right to enact laws through 9.41.290 - the ability to make laws concerning the locations for sale and transfer of weapons.
First thoughts:
1. You cannot use this case as precedent to extend a municipalities ability to prohibit weapons in stadiums and convention centers to other ciy property.
2. They know this and would hope the ignorance of many will help us be safer by leaving our CCW weapon at home. It is the Casino's 'no weapons allowed citing 9.41.300' signs again.
I will open carry any time I am on City Property.
158 Wn. 2d. 342, Oct. 2006 Pac. Nw. Shooting Park Ass'n v. City of Sequim (http://pws.cablespeed.com/~matthughes/Precedent.doc)
Highlights:
SANDERS , J.M. JOHNSON , and CHAMBERS , JJ., dissent by separate opinions.
Nature of Action: A gun show organizer and a federally licensed firearms collector sought damages from a city and its police chief for tortious interference with a contractual relationship or business expectancy. The plaintiffs also alleged statutory violations by the defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that three of the conditions placed on the temporary use permit issued by the city for use of the city's convention center for a gun show were unlawful and improper.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Clallam County, No. 02-2-00866-9, Thomas J. Majhan, J., on June 23, 2003, entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
Court of Appeals: The court affirmed the judgment by an unpublished opinion noted at 123 Wn. App. 1014 (2004).
Supreme Court: Holding that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead a claim for tortious interference with contractual relationships or business expectancies between gun show vendors and the general public and that the permit conditions did not violate statutes restricting what sorts of gun ordinances municipalities may enact, the court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
John D. Black (of John D. Black, P.L.L.C. ) and Richard M. Stephens (of Groen Stephens & Klinge, L.L.P. ), for petitioners.
Robert L. Christie (of Christie Law Group, P.L.L.C. ), for respondents.
1. FAIRHURST, J. - Petitioners Pacific Northwest Shooting Park Association (PNSPA), a nonprofit corporation, and Lawrence Witt, a federally licensed firearms collector, seek reversal of an unpublished Court of Appeals decision affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the city of Sequim. PNSPA brought suit against the city and its police chief, Byron Nelson, alleging tortious interference with a contractual relationship or business expectancy between PNSPA and the city to use the city's convention center for a gun show. It also claimed that the city's actions violated RCW 9.41.290 and .300. PNSPA later argued that the city interfered with its business expectancies with vendors and the general public, but it failed to amend its complaint to add this claim. We hold that the question of interference with PNSPA's contractual relationships or business expectancies with vendors and the general public is not properly before us and do not decide the question. We also find that the city did not violate either RCW 9.41.290 or .300. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
I. FACTS
2. On April 3, 2002, PNSPA applied to the city for a temporary use permit to hold a gun show at the Guy Cole Convention Center from April 13 to April 14, 2002. The purpose stated on the application was for a gun show that was to include sales and "Display of Merchandise." Suppl. Clerk's Papers (SCP) at 8. On the application form, PNSPA was required to indicate what the property would be used for and the application stated that approval was subject to any attached conditions. The city distributed the application form, along with a separate memorandum, to Clallam County Fire District No. 3, the police department, public works, and the city manager, soliciting their comments or conditions. The public works department and the city manager each returned a copy of the separate memorandum with handwritten comments and questions. The fire district and the police department provided separate memoranda with their conditions.
3. An undated document entitled "Special Conditions of Approval" was attached to the permit application. SCP at 13. It listed five conditions.«1»Only the first of these "special" conditions, the attached conditions from the police department, is at issue here.
«1»The first condition referred to separate attached conditions from the police department. The second condition required that PNSPA comply with city sign regulations. The third condition referred to separate attached conditions from the fire district. The fourth condition required that the city be listed as the point of sale for all transactions. The fifth condition required PNSPA to contact the planning, public works, and police departments to verify that it was in compliance before the show.
4. Chief Nelson sent two memoranda to the city planning department, one dated April 9, 2002, and a second dated April 11, 2002, that superseded the April 9, 2002, memorandum. Only the second memorandum is at issue. April 11, 2002, is the date on which the city gave final approval to the permit application. The April 11, 2002, memorandum had 15 conditions, only three of which are being contested. The conditions required that (1) only dealers could "dispose of" handguns and then only to state residents, (2) only dealers could purchase or acquire firearms from unlicensed individuals, and (3) unlicensed dealers could not sell firearms at all. SCP at 18.
5. It is not clear from the record whether PNSPA received a copy of the April 9, 2002, memorandum, nor is it clear whether PNSPA received copies of the approved permit with all the referenced attachments on April 11, 2002, the date it was approved. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the conditions were imposed as part of a routine internal process for approval of applications to use the convention center, and PNSPA was aware in advance that the city might impose conditions on that use. Further, PNSPA does not allege that it failed to receive timely the documents containing the permit conditions. PNSPA merely alleges that Chief Nelson acted improperly by coming to the convention center on April 12, 2002, the day before the show, and "announcing" the conditions of use to the participants. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 80. As a result of Chief Nelson's "announcement," PNSPA claims that many vendors packed up and left the show and attendance by the public was significantly lower than expected. Id .
31 A municipality acts in a proprietary capacity when it "acts as the proprietor of a business enterprise for the private advantage of the [municipality]" and it may "exercise its business powers in much the same way as a private individual or corporation." Hite v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2 of Grant County , 112 Wn.2d 456 , 459, 772 P.2d 481 (1989); Branson v. Port of Seattle , 152 Wn.2d 862 , 870, 101 P.3d 67 (2004). When acting in a proprietary capacity, a city may enter into any contract " 'which is necessary to render the system efficient and beneficial to the public.' " Hite , 112 Wn.2d at 460 (quoting Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 , 17 Wn. App. 861 , 864, 565 P.2d 1221 (1977)); see also Stover v. Winston Bros. Co. , 185 Wash. 416 , 422, 55 P.2d 821 (1936). By issuing a temporary use permit, the city was leasing its property to PNSPA and acting in its private capacity as a property owner.
32 The preemption clause does not prohibit a private property owner from imposing conditions on the sale of firearms on his or her property. RCW 9.41.290 . Applying our reasoning in Cherry , it follows that a municipal property owner like a private property owner may impose conditions related to firearms for the use of its property in order to protect its property interests. For the same reason that a municipal employer may enact policies regarding possession of firearms in the workplace because a private employer may do so, a municipal property owner should be allowed to impose conditions related to sales of firearms on its property if a private property owner may impose them. The critical point is that the conditions the city imposed related to a permit for private use of its property. They were not laws or regulations of application to the general public.
[7, 8]27 The text of RCW 9.41.290 states that the state of Washington has fully occupied and preempted the field of firearms regulation. That preemption covers regulations related to possession, purchase, sale, acquisition, and transfer of firearms, all of which are potentially at issue at a gun show. However, RCW 9.41.290 and .300 together explicitly allow cities, towns, counties, and municipalities to enact laws and ordinances restricting firearm possession in stadiums and convention centers they operate.
I have not had the time to read through the whole thing but have summarized the key wording as best that I can in 10 minutes. Most of us know most of the wording here except for the opinioned pieces but at this time I am concluding that he is trying to extend their right to enact laws concerning possession in stadiums and conventions to other city property by citing this case and using their right to enact laws through 9.41.290 - the ability to make laws concerning the locations for sale and transfer of weapons.
First thoughts:
1. You cannot use this case as precedent to extend a municipalities ability to prohibit weapons in stadiums and convention centers to other ciy property.
2. They know this and would hope the ignorance of many will help us be safer by leaving our CCW weapon at home. It is the Casino's 'no weapons allowed citing 9.41.300' signs again.
I will open carry any time I am on City Property.
